This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a di®erentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. Cournot competition is shown to induce more R&D e®ort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is higher in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more e±cient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, spillovers are weak, or products are very di®erent. If R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong and goods are close substitutes, the Bertrand equilibrium becomes less e±cient than the Cournot equilibrium.
Introduction
It is well understood that (i) equilibrium prices are lower and outputs are higher in Bertrand (price) competition than in Cournot (quantity) competition, and (ii) the Bertrand equilibrium is more e±cient than the Cournot equilibrium, in terms of greater consumer surplus and welfare (see Singh and Vives [8] , Cheng [3] , and Vives [10] ). These traditional results are obtained under the assumption that¯rms face the same demand and cost structure in both types of competition. To make the comparison meaningful, such a static assumption seems reasonable and desirable. However, this assumption may not be innocuous because¯rms often compete against each other by investing in research and development (R&D) to improve in product quality (in the case of product R&D) and/or to reduce production cost (in the case of process R&D). As a result, the structure of market demand and cost of production may change. In such a dynamic environment, if R&D investments are di®erent in Bertrand and Cournot competition, the post-innovation demand and cost structures will be di®erent even though they were identical before the R&D competition. The ensuing important question is whether the traditional result still holds will be a®ected in any way.
The present study focuses on cost-reducing R&D and re-examines the relative e±ciency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. The case for cost-reducing R&D is of particular interest. As I shall show,¯rms invest more in R&D in Cournot competition than in Bertrand competition.
With lower pre-competition production costs in Cournot competition, do the¯rms still charge lower prices and produce more in Bertrand competition? Even if the answer is yes, it does not always yield the traditional welfare results since the cost of production is now larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. In other words, if the market with Bertrand competition enjoys higher static e±ciency, will it necessarily lead to higher dynamic e±ciency?
In this paper, I¯rst introduce the basic model in Section 2, which is more complete than those used by Singh and Vives [8] and others. I then derive the equilibrium when the market is characterized by a Cournot game. In Section 3, I repeat the same exercise in a Bertrand game.
In Sections 4 and 5, I show that although¯rms conduct more R&D and therefore have lower post-innovation costs in Cournot competition, 1 they still charge higher prices, produce less, and generate a smaller consumer surplus than those in Bertrand competition. If R&D productivity is low, spillovers are weak, or goods are not close substitutes, the Bertrand equilibrium is shown to be more e±cient, in terms of larger total surplus, than the Cournot equilibrium; but the opposite holds when R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong and product di®erentiation is low.
The Basic Model and Cournot Equilibrium
Consider a non-cooperative two-stage game with two¯rms producing di®erentiated goods. In thē rst stage (R&D stage), each¯rm independently undertakes cost-reducing R&D. In the second stage (market stage), both¯rms produce and sell their products to the market. I¯rst consider Cournot (quantity) competition in this section. The case of Bertrand (price) competition is relegated to the next section.
Following Singh and Vives [8] , I assume that the representative consumer's utility function
, where q i is the quantity of the good produced bȳ rm i, ® > 0, and°2 (0; 1). The degree of product di®erentiation decreases with the parameter°.
The resulting market demands are linear and given by
The two¯rms start with the same constant marginal cost c(< ®). If only¯rm i does R&D, then by spending V (x i ) on R&D it can lower its marginal cost by x i . It is commonly assumed that R&D investment has diminishing returns and that the R&D expenditure function is quadratic (e.g., d'Aspremont and Jacquemin [4] 
, where the parameter v relates to the e±ciency or productivity of the R&D technology (higher v means lower e±ciency). Assume A1: v > ®=c: 1 [2] analyze R&D incentives in a Cournot model and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura [5] examine them in a Bertrand model. Bester and Petrakis [1] have also compared R&D incentives in Bertrand and Cournot competition but reached a di®erent conclusion. An explanation of reasons behind the di®erences will be given in Section 4.
Brander and Spencer
It will be shown below that A1 guarantees positive post-innovation costs of production in both price and quantity competition. A1 is also needed for the second-order and stability conditions. To understand A1, note that if the demand is very strong (i.e., ® is large) and the pre-innovation cost of production c is not too high, then the R&D technology should not be too e±cient or otherwise the¯rms will invest a lot in R&D, resulting in zero or even negative post-innovation costs, which is unrealistic.
To model the spillover e®ects of R&D, I assume that the¯rms' marginal costs are
i; j = 1; 2; and i 6 = j;
should they spend V (x 1 ) and V (x 2 ) on R&D, respectively. The parameter µ 2 [0; 1] captures the extent of spillovers.
I use the backward induction approach to derive sub-game perfect equilibria. Let ¼ i denotē rm i's market pro¯t (pro¯t excluding R&D costs). Then given any¯rst-stage R&D outcome
The¯rms choose output to maximize their respective market pro¯ts and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is
I now turn to the R&D stage. Each¯rm chooses an R&D level to maximize its overall pro¯t,
where ¢ C´v (2 +°)(4 ¡°2) ¡ 2(2 ¡ µ°)(1 + µ). It is straightforward to verify the following lemma (the proof is omitted).
Lemma 1. For all µ and°, A1 is su±cient but not necessary for v(4¡°2) 2 ¡2(2¡µ°) 2 > 0 (the second-order condition) and ¢C > 0 (the stability condition); A1 is both necessary and su±cient
2 The second-order and the Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions are, respectively,
Substituting x C into (1) and (2) gives the (symmetric) equilibrium output and price:
Finally, I obtain the equilibrium consumer surplus [CS = U(q 1 ; q 2 ) ¡ p 1 q 1 ¡ p 2 q 2 ], producer pro¯ts (¦ = ¦ 1 + ¦ 2 ), and welfare (total surplus) in Cournot competition as follows:
Bertrand Equilibrium
Suppose now the product market involves Bertrand competition. Rewrite (1) as
Given any¯rst-stage R&D outcome (x 1 ; x 2 ),¯rm i in the market stage chooses p i to maximize its market pro¯t. The resulting Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is
In the R&D stage, each¯rm chooses its R&D level to maximize its overall pro¯t. In the (symmetric) equilibrium, both¯rms choose
where
It is now possible to check the following lemma (the proof is straightforward and omitted).
Lemma 2. For all µ and°, A1 is su±cient but not necessary for ¢B > 0 (the stability condition), and it is both necessary and su±cient for c ¡ (1 + µ)x B > 0 (positive post-innovation costs). If µ = 1, the second-order condition for optimal x B is v(1 +°)(2 ¡°) 2 ¡ 2(1 ¡°) > 0, which is ensured by A1; but if µ 6 = 1, the second-order condition is
and A1 is no longer su±cient to ensure (10) for all°and µ.
A brief discussion of Lemma 2 regarding the second-order condition is in order. According to (10) , if µ is not equal to 1 and°is very close to one, v must be large in order to satisfy the second-order condition for an interior solution of optimal R&D. When the two goods are close substitutes, competition is¯erce as both¯rms cut prices to seize market shares. The ability of the¯rms to lower prices, however, is limited by their marginal costs. Suppose v is small, i.e., it is not too costly to do R&D. In this case, a¯rm is always willing to invest a lot to create a cost advantage over its rival so as to win the price war. That means, v has to be large to avoid a corner solution which results from an extremely large R&D investment. When µ = 1, such a restriction on v is not needed. With perfect spillovers, no pre-competition cost advantages could occur and so this motive of R&D investment goes away. In fact, as°approaches one, x B becomes zero [see (9)].
Using (9) in (7) and (8), I obtain the market equilibrium:
Finally, I calculate the equilibrium consumer surplus, producer pro¯ts, and welfare (total surplus) in Bertrand competition:
Comparison I: R&D Incentives
Before comparing the two equilibria, I¯rst derive the socially optimal (or the¯rst-best) allocation as a benchmark. The social planner's problem is 3 max
In general, the degree of cross-¯rm R&D spillover is jointly determined by many factors including the nature of technologies, the legal framework, and the information control of the¯rms. I consider the case in which even the social planner cannot a®ect µ.
A2: v > 4®=c:
This assumption is necessary and su±cient for the optimal post-innovation costs to be positive, and is su±cient but not necessary to ensure the second-order condition for the social planner's problem.
It is easily veri¯ed that the social planner's optimal decision is symmetric and given by
Would the¯rms invest more in R&D when the product market involves Cournot competition than when it involves Bertrand competition? How are these investment levels compared to thē rst-best levels. What are the comparisons between the Bertrand and Cournot outputs and prices when the pre-competition production costs are endogenously determined by the¯rst-stage R&D e®orts? These are the questions that beg for answers. A simple and direct comparison based on (3), (9) and (14) immediately yields the following proposition. In words, Proposition 1 states that the¯rms always invest more in R&D if the product market involves Cournot competition than if it involves Bertrand competition, but in both cases they invest less than the social optimum. The key to the understanding of this result is to carefully examine the factors that induce the¯rms to undertake R&D and their interactions in di®erent competition modes. Even with general demand and R&D cost functions, I can decompose each rm's R&D e®ect into four parts (see Appendix for derivation). In Cournot competition,
In Bertrand competition,
First, the¯rm's R&D lowers the unit cost of production. For a given cost reduction, ceteris paribus, the more it produces, the more it bene¯ts. Thus, the size e®ect is always positive (i.e., it gives the¯rm incentives to do R&D) in both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Second, the¯rm's R&D also lowers its rival's cost, which in turn is detrimental to the R&D-taking¯rm.
Because of this, the spillover e®ect is always negative (i.e., it gives the¯rm disincentives to do R&D) in both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Third, R&D activity is costly, implying that the cost e®ect is negative in both types of competition. Finally, the¯rm's R&D lowers its production cost and so a®ects the rival¯rm's output or price decision. This is the strategic e®ect and, unlike the other e®ects, is positive in Cournot competition but negative in Bertrand competition. In the Cournot case, by doing more R&D and thereby lowering its cost, the¯rm is tougher in the market and thus discourages its rival's sale, which in turn bene¯ts itself. 4 In contrast, in the Bertrand case, the¯rm's R&D lowers its cost and induces its rival to cut price, which in turn hurts itself. 5
In the central planning case, both the spillover and strategic e®ects are internalized. The spillover e®ect becomes positive 6 and the strategic e®ect vanishes. Other comparisons hinge on the relative importance of the three e®ects that gives rise to the ranking reported in Proposition 1. 7 4 This positive strategic e®ect leads to over-investment in the absence of spillovers (see Brander and Spencer [2] ).
5 This negative strategic e®ect leads to under-investment in the absence of spillovers (see OkunoFujiwara and Suzumura [5] ).
6 This is because @x S =@µ > 0 from (14). 7 For more detailed discussions on these three e®ects, see Qiu [6] , [7] .
It is worth pointing out that while I obtain a unique Propositions 1 and 2 together convey a new message: Although Cournot¯rms make more R&D investments and therefore have lower costs than Bertrand¯rms, the Bertrand¯rms still charge lower prices and produce more than the Cournot¯rms. However, greater outputs and lower prices do not ensure larger total surplus as costs of production in Bertrand competition are higher than those in Cournot competition. This warrants a careful scrutiny of the e±ciency issue which is the focus of the next section.
Comparison II: Welfare and E±ciency
Obviously, welfare is highest in the case of social planning. However, it is not so clear for the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. In what follows, I¯rst examine the case of perfect spillovers, then the case of no spillovers, and¯nally the case of µ 2 (0; 1).
For µ = 1, the welfare functions in Cournot competition can be simpli¯ed to
where ¢ C1´v (2 +°) 2 ¡ 4, and in Bertrand competition to
where ¢ B1´v (1 +°)(2 ¡°) 2 ¡ 4(1 ¡°). Note that when v is large, R&D investment will be small in both types of competition. Consider the more interesting case wherein R&D could be large. Succinctly, assume that A1 is not too restrictive for v in the sense that
Proposition 3. Suppose that µ = 1, and both A1 and A3 hold.
Proof. See Appendix.
The main message contained in Proposition 3 is that the Bertrand equilibrium does not always have higher dynamic e±ciency than the Cournot equilibrium. This is in contrast to the traditional result. The underlying intuition is as follows. It is well known (Singh and Vives [8] )
that, in the absence of R&D investment, consumer surplus is larger in the Bertrand equilibrium, but the Bertrand pro¯ts are lower. Given the opportunity to reduce pre-competition production The above discussion also implies that the traditional result should continue to hold in the absence of spillovers. This is stated in Proposition 4 below and proved in the appendix. concludes that the traditional result holds for small µ or°, and the opposite result holds for large µ and°. The explanation for this claim is as follows. Although spillovers adversely a®ect individual¯rms' incentives to invest in R&D, they enhance welfare from the social point of view. 8 Since¯rms do more R&D in Cournot than in Bertrand competition, the welfare increase from a larger spillover is greater in Cournot than in Bertrand competition. Thus, for given v and°, it is more likely that the Cournot equilibrium has greater e±ciency than the Bertrand equilibrium as µ increases, and it is less likely that the Cournot equilibrium gives larger welfare as µ decreases.
Proposition 5. Suppose that µ 2 (0; 1), and both A1 and A3 hold. Also suppose that for any given°2 (0; 1), inequality (10) holds and in particular v ¤ satis¯es (10). Then, given°, either 8 To see this, simply apply the envelope theorem to W S .
(i) W B > W C , 8v and µ, or
and µ 2 (0; 1), and
Furthermore, for°close to 0, outcome (i) prevails. For°close to 1, outcome (ii) prevails.
Concluding Remarks
The main¯nding of the present study is that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, the Cournot equilibrium can be more e±cient than the Bertrand equilibrium. First, when R&D is not too costly,¯rms in Cournot competition invest much more in R&D and thus have much lower production costs than they do in Bertrand competition. Second, when spillovers are su±ciently high, the resulting welfare increase from more R&D investment is drastic.
Except in the case of perfect spillovers, the strongest condition imposed for most of the results to hold is condition (10), which ensures interior solutions of optimal R&D investment. It might be of interest to carry out further study on the corner-solution equilibrium once condition (10) is relaxed.
Government intervention in R&D investment, especially for the type of R&D with strong spillovers, is a world-wide common practice . When R&D investment is controlled through either subsidization or taxation, will the welfare superiority of Bertrand competition be reinstated? Elsewhere ( [7] ), I have shown that in the case of Cournot competition, R&D subsidy is optimal, i.e., subsidy is preferred to laissez faire and tax. Since under-investment is more serious in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition as evident from Proposition 1, a larger subsidy is required in Bertrand competition. If that is the case, the R&D di®erential between
Cournot and Bertrand competition would be reduced. Recall that a larger R&D investment in Cournot competition is the reason for the welfare of Cournot competition being higher than that of Bertrand competition. Also note that the subsidy per se is simply a transfer from the government to the¯rms, and so it is cancelled out in the welfare function (it does a®ect the equilibrium welfare though). Therefore, the possibility that the Cournot equilibrium dominates the Bertrand equilibrium in welfare term would be lower in the presence of government intervention than laissez faire. Whether the Cournot equilibrium can dominate the Bertrand equilibrium with government intervention deserves a closer scrutiny.
Appendix
A. Decomposition of R&D incentives.
Consider general market demand
The¯rst-order conditions for Cournot-Nash outputs are,
Assume that both the second-order conditions and the stability condition are satis¯ed, i.e.,
Di®erentiating the¯rst-order conditions with respect to x i yields 0
from which I obtain
Note also @¼ i =@q j = q i (@p i =@q j ) < 0 for substitute products, and @¼ i =@x i = q i > 0: Thus,
Derivation of the decomposition for Bertrand competition is similar and hence I omit it. 2 B. Proof of Proposition 3.
F (v;°); where
De¯ne G(v;°) = F (v;°)=(v°2). It follows that sign(W B1 ¡ W C1 ) = sign(G).
Simpli¯cation and term collection yield G(v;°) = 16g 1 ¡ 8g 2 v + g 3 v 2 ; where
Since the second derivative is positive (G vv = 2g 3 > 0), G is strictly convex in v. Moreover, g 2 2 ¡ g 1 g 3 > 0 for all°2 (0; 1). Thus, given any°, there exist two real solutions to G = 0, which are
With the help of Mathematica (Wolfram [9] ), it can be shown that v 
De¯ne G(v;°; µ) = F (v;°; µ)=[v°2(4 ¡°2)]. It follows that sign(W B ¡ W C ) = sign(G). After collecting terms, I obtain
Since G vv > 0, G is strictly convex in v. Note, g 2 2 ¡ g 1 g 3 > 0 for all°2 (0; 1) and µ 2 [0; 1). Thus, given any°and µ, there exist two real solutions to G = 0. As in the proof of Proposition 3, I only need to consider the high-value solution, i.e., Second, calculate v ¤ 2 (°; 1) for the given°. Either v = v ¤ 2 (°; 1) satis¯es both A1 and (10) or it violates at least one of the conditions. In the latter case, all v = v ¤ 2 (°; µ) will violate at least A1 or (10) . It follows that for v satisfying A1 and (10), G > 0; 8µ 2 (0; 1) (using Figure 2 and the argument similar to that used in the proof of Proposition 4). In the former case, using Figure   2 and the arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 3, we know that outcome (ii) is the result. 
